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Does his failure imply that negative rights theories, i.e., theories of
the sorts of rights affirmed in the American founding, are simply
untenable? Some would say so. I would say instead that the current efforts at establishing negative rights have one very odd feature.
There is a strenuous effort to defend Lockean rights, but just as
strenuous an effort to avoid Lockean grounds for doing so. We
have had Nozick's Kantian theory and now Machan's half-Aristotelian argument, but not a Lockean theory. There are difficulties
with Locke's own version of rights theory, I admit, but there was a
tradition, much of it in America, which worked at Lockean rights
in a Lockean way. I will close with the suggestion that what we
need from our rights theorists now is a strenuous effort to think
Lockean rights through in a Lockean manner.

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM. By Bernard Grofman• and Donald Wittman,2
eds. New York: Agathon Press. 1989. Pp. 296. $42.00
cloth, $18.00 paper.
Daniel A. Farber J

For most readers of this journal, the first question about The
Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism is probably, "What
on earth is 'The New Institutionalism'?" This is a simple question,
which unfortunately has no equally simple answer. The "New Institutionalism" is one of several names for a new school of scholarship about government, which is also known as "rational choice,"
"social choice," or-most commonly-"public choice." Both the
proper name for the school and the exact boundaries of its subject
matter are still hotly contested, and already sub-schools have arisen.
This is a field very much in flux, and therefore difficult to define.
Still, at least a tentative definition is necessary in order to proceed. One of the editors of the book defines the field as including
"analyses using tools derived from microeconomics, game theory,
and social choice to the effect of decision-making rules and institutional structure on outcomes." More simply, James Buchanan
(who won the Nobel prize in economics for his work in the area)
defines public choice as "the application of the theoretical method
and techniques of modem economics to the study of political
I.
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processes."4
Political scientists are understandably a bit unhappy with
Buchanan's definition, since it gives another discipline primary jurisdiction over an important piece of intellectual territory. As they
are quick to point out, much of the significant work in the field has
been done from the start by political scientists; economists hold no
patent on game theory and other mathematical techniques. From a
law professor's point of view, however, public choice looks very
much like a branch of "law and economics." Both use equations
and fancy graphs to describe a world of perfectly rational utilitymaximizers.s At least heuristically, public choice can be usefully
defined as the use of the economist's techniques to study the political scientist's problems.
Teachers of constitutional law tend not to be favorably inclined
toward "Law and Economics," and some may feel a reflexive hostility at the idea that their own field is being invaded by economists.
In part, this reaction may be attributable to the happenstance that
constitutional scholars are generally more liberal than those in law
and economics.6 Moreover, many familiar concerns about economic analysis such as its unrealistic assumption of complete rationality, apply at least as strongly to public choice.' But while the
impulse to reject public choice out of hand is understandable, it is
also mistaken. As structural issues of various kinds--particularly
regarding the separation of powers-have grown more central to
constitutional law, the need for a better understanding of the political process has increased. We should not dismiss any possible
source of illumination without serious consideration, and even at
this relatively early stage of its development, public choice does
have some interesting insights.
Your next question, most likely, is how public choice relates to
the Federalist papers. The answer is that there is more relationship
than you'd expect to find between the writings of two eighteenth
century politicians and the latest mathematical models of politics.
4. Brennan & Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74
VA. L. REv. 179 ( 1988). This article is part of a symposium on public choice, which provides
a good introduction to the subject for legal readers. A more systematic introduction is provided by D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL INTRODUC·
TION (forthcoming, University of Chicago Press, 1991). Those seeking a more technical
treatment should consult D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (1989).
5. Fortunately for potential law school readers, graphs and equations are used sparingly in this book; most of it is written in perfectly lucid English.
6. Public choice has sometimes had a strong conservative bent, though the papers in
this volume are happily free of ideological overtones.
7. Some of those criticisms are discussed in chapters l and 2 of D. FARBER & P.
FRICKEY, supra, note 4.
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Like the modern public choice theorists, Publius often analyzed behavior as the result of calculated self-interest. Like Publius, public
choice theorists conclude that procedure and institutional design
can be critical in controlling the behavior of these self-interested
individuals. In particular, Madisonian devices such as bicameralism are supported by public choice theorists as mechanisms for increasing legislative stability.s So a certain, somewhat surprising
resemblance does exist.
On the other hand, the differences are equally substantial, as
some of the contributors to this book point out. Madison and Hamilton relied heavily on history as a basis for inductions about government. Public choice scholars, on the other hand, rely almost
entirely on formal mathematical models for their theories of government. Despite being less rigorous (or perhaps because of their lack
of rigor), Madison and Hamilton had a broader and richer concept
of political life, in which self-interested calculations were only one
element. Scholars who are primarily interested in the Federalist
will find little here to illuminate their understanding of Madison
and Hamilton, while public choice theorists will not find the Federalist a particularly rich source for future model-building.
Nevertheless, understanding the connection between the Federalist and public choice is useful for several reasons. It may help
"public choicers" to see how their model-building relates to the
traditional concerns of political science. Putting public choice into
this context may also make it easier for political scientists to view
public choice as something other than an act of intellectual imperialism by their economist colleagues. It may also make present-day
analysts take the Federalist more seriously by giving some of its
concerns the additional cachet of the latest mathematical methods.
Finally, several contributors to the book evidently found re-reading
the Federalist a useful exercise, helpfully reminding them of those
aspects of political life that public choice theory abstracts away. On
the whole, then, use of the Federalist papers as a thematic device
seems justified.
What makes this book valuable, however, is less its overall
theme than the generally high quality of the individual contributions. I found three of the papers particularly interesting. 9
The first is Russell Hardin's "Why a Constitution?"to Hardin
8. This point is explained in the essay by Miller and Hammond.
9. My choice of these three papers is not meant to reflect any invidious judgment
about the quality of the other papers. These three just happened to strike my fancy.
10. Hardin may be familiar to many readers as the author of a famous essay, "The
Tragedy of the Commons."
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points out some of the pitfalls in the familiar concept of the Constitution as a sort of contract. To an economist, a contract is an agreement whereby parties exchange performances over time; the point
of having an enforceable contract is to eliminate the temptation for
one party to receive the benefits of the contract and then renege.
The Constitution is not much like this kind of contract. It does not
specify reciprocal transfers of goods between groups. Nor is it subject to enforcement by any external authority. As Hardin says,
"(t]here was no general incentive to anyone to enter the agreement
in the hope of later cheating and refusing to cooperate, as one might
well do with a contract . . . ."
Instead of being best viewed as a contract, Hardin suggests, the
Constitution may be more analogous to a "convention"-like driving on the right side of the road. Rather than being exchanges between individuals, conventions function to coordinate their actions,
and this is very much the purpose of a constitution. One consequence of Hardin's analysis is to deemphasize consent as a basis for
legitimacy. Conventions once in place persist because having some
scheme of coordination is in everyone's interest and switching a
large group to a new scheme is too difficult.
As Wittman's perceptive introduction notes,u many long-term
contracts share the traits which Hardin attributes to conventions.12
Thus, the distinction between contracts and conventions is fuzzier
than Hardin suggests. Nevertheless, although the full implications
of Hardin's thesis are unclear, it strikes me as potentially fruitful.
For instance, it helps explain why, having been adopted by thenarrowest of margins, the Constitution soon commanded general support even from its former opponents. The benefits of having some
convention in place often outweigh the faults of a particular convention, as Hardin points out:
Indeed, one of the most compelling considerations in defense of a particular procedure is merely that it has been in use for a while already. This is often the persuasive force of, say, Robert's Rules of Order, which may be invoked to settle debate in
some peculiar circumstance. People who strongly disagree on how to proceed typically desist from debate immediately when shown some arcane rule in this tedious
book born of long experience.

Once the Constitution went into effect, it was able to profit from
what we might call the "Hardin effect."
A different aspect of public choice is highlighted by Steven
II. This may be an appropriate point to observe that the introductory comments by the
editors are uniformly very useful.
12. The Constitution itself might also be usefully considered as being something like a
long-term contract. See, The "Unwritten Constitution" and the U. C. C., 6 CoNST. Co MM. 217
(1989).
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Brams's paper, "Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Coequal?"13 Brams uses a game theory concept, the Banzhaf power
value, to assess the relative power of the House and Senate.14
Somewhat crudely, the Banzhaf value is the relative likelihood that
an individual will cast a deciding vote. Individual senators get a
Banzhaf index of .00329, so the hundred senators collectively have
an index of .32881.1s With individual indices of .00146, members of
the House collectively get a Banzhaf value of .63316.16 Thus, according to Brams, the House has more collective power than the
Senate.l 7 He finds some empirical support for this conclusion in
statistics showing that a bill which passes the House has a seventysix percent chance of passing the Senate, while a Senate bill has only
a sixty-one percent chance of passing the House.
As Brams himself admits, and as Mark Petraea suggests more
forcefully in his response to Brams, this is a pretty crude analysis.1s
A number of other institutional features should be taken into account in the model, such as the powers of committees and of the
Speaker of the House, not to mention the leverage created by parliamentary devices such as the filibuster. Moreover, without a better
account of why legislation originates in one house or the other,
Brams's empirical data doesn't mean much. Petraea also points out
that it's not clear what Banzhaf indices mean in this context, and
that question needs some further thought.19 Still, the whole idea of
13. According to his biographical sketch, Brams is the author of a number of works on
game theory and national security, as well as a book with the marvelous title SUPERIOR
BEINGS: IF THEY EXIST, HOW WOULD WE KNow?
14. His analysis applies only to measures requiring bicameral approval, and does not
consider the Senate's special treaty and confirmation powers.
15. Since the Vice-President can vote to break a tie about as often as any individual
senator, presumably his index is about the same. Perhaps his index should be added to the
President's, who controls his vote. (Any bill which the Vice President could kill would also
be subject to an override proof veto, so it is really only the Vice President's power to vote
"yes" that matters.)
16. Another essay by John Chamberlin gives each Justice a power value of .009, about
the same as the combined power of three senators. The Court collectively gets an index of
.086, while the President gets only .035. Chamberlin himself admits that these figures about
the Court probably don't mean a great deal.
17. Brams concludes that the House's advantage is even greater with respect to passing
constitutional amendments.
18. Brams has particular difficulty estimating the power of the president relative to
Congress. He at first concludes that a president is about as strong as ten senators combined,
but much weaker than either house as a whole. A few pages later he backpedals.
19. Apparently, this interpretative difficulty is not limited to Brams's paper:
Both the Shapley and Banzhaf-Coleman indices have been extended to compound games, for which the researcher seeks to compute, for example, the
probability that a randomly selected voter in Alaska is pivotal in a presidential election, compared with the probability that a voter from California is pivotal. At this
point, however, the relationship of these analyses to game theory grows ever more
speculative. The indices reflect no particular game or the modeling of specific sets
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trying to measure the relative power of the various branches of government is fascinating,2o and deserves further refinement.2I
The third paper relates to the Federalist's era rather than its
contents. Robert McGuire and Robert Ohsfeldt, in "Public Choice
Analysis and the Ratification of the Constitution," reconsider the
Beardian thesis that the Constitution is rooted in economic self-interest. Recent historians have been skeptical of Beard's thesis, finding little evidence of an economic pattern in the ratification votes.
McGuire and Ohsfeldt are the first, however, to use rigorous statistical techniques to analyze the data.22 They conclude that economic factors played a dramatic role:
In terms of the magnitude of the effects, for a hypothetical delegate with average values of all other independent variables, owning private securities increases the
predicted probability of a yes vote from about .59 to about .84. Being in personal
debt, for a hypothetical delegate with average values of all other variables, decreases
the predicted probability of a yes vote from about .62 to about .36. Merchant interests increase the predicted probability from about .59 to about .72, with all other
independent variables held constant at the sample mean.

If McGuire and Ohsfeldt are right, does that mean that the
historians who've studied the same voting records overlooked an
of individual decisions, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the differences between the indices in a particular context, or to appreciate their implications,
if any, for policy.
P. 0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND PoLmCAL THEORY: A INTRODUCTION 469-70
(1986).
20. Another essay tries to measure another imponderable, the stability of public opinion. One of Publius's concerns was to insulate the government from the fickle winds of public
opinion. But in a provocative paper, "Restraining the Whims and Passions of the Public,"
Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro conclude that public opinion is remarkably stable. They
examine (as nearly as possible) every available survey of American policy preferences from
1935 to 1985, some six thousand questions about public policy in all. With respect to sixtythree percent of the domestic policy issues, they found no significant change at all. Most of
the changes that did occur were small (under six percentage points). Page and Shapiro also
report that the public relies most heavily on relatively reliable sources of information, rather
than on communications by interest groups. In a comment on these findings, Chappell and
Keach point out that most of the policy issues studied had been around for a long time and
might have reached an equilibrium, while other issues may come and go more quickly. (They
also point out the significance of voter myopia: "[T)he overall economic performances of the
Carter and the first Reagan administration were quite similar, but the timing of the most
satisfactory portions was such that shortsighted voters may have given Reagan an undeserved
advantage.") I would like to see a more extended treatment of the evidence relating to
stability.
21. Given all of these difficulties, it may be too early even to speculate about implications of these findings for law. Nevertheless, one possible implication relates to statutory
interpretation. One way of thinking about statutory interpretation is to focus on the "median" or swing voter, whose assent was needed to get a statute enacted. Brams's finding
suggests that the critical legislator is more likely to be found in the House than in the Senate.
22. I won't pretend to attempt an assessment of the validity of their modeling, except to
note that their methodology (logit analysis) is commonly used in studies of roll-call votes, and
they seem to have included a fairly broad list of variables in the analysis.
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obvious pattern? Not necessarily.23 It's quite possible that both results are right: that is, that economic factors strongly influenced
individual voters but did not create clear differences in group votes.
For example, prior historical studies show no clear connection
between slaveholding and ratification votes. But McGuire and Ohsfeldt find a strong connection: "For a delegate who personally
owned slaves and had average values of all other independent variables, the predicted probability of a yes vote is about .41; for a delegate who owned no slaves and had average values of all other
independent variables, the predicted probability of a yes vote is
about .75."24 These results are not necessarily contradictory. Note
that McGuire and Ohsfeldt are speaking of the effect of slaveholding on delegates with "average values of all other independent variables." There's no reason to think, however, that slaveholders as a
group did have average values of all other variables, and so this
finding cannot be directly translated into a statement about the degree of support for the Constitution among flesh-and-blood slaveholders as a group.
All other things being equal, individual slaveholders may have
been much more likely to vote against ratification-but all other
things weren't equal, because slaveholders as a group were different
on average from nonslaveholders. Slaveholders might, for instance,
have been more likely to own western land claims, which would
have disposed them toward ratification. On balance, for many of
them, the pull of their other interests may have outweighed the
push of slaveholding. So it could be true both that slaveholding
caused individuals to oppose the Constitution, and that there was
no clear pattern of opposition among slaveholders as a group.
The slaveholding issue is a particularly interesting one. At
least since Garrison called the Constitution a "Covenant with
Death and an Agreement with Hel1,"2s there has been debate about
whether the framers "sold out" to the slave states. McGuire and
Ohsfeldt's results suggest that the Constitution was viewed by the
slaveowners themselves as unfavorable to slavery, and that to the
extent they supported it at all, they did so for other reasons.
Like the other contributions to this volume, these three papers
are not "paradigm shifting" works that will transform the way we
think about the Constitution. They don't even have strong immedi23. Although in fact there may have been more of a pattern than those studies revealed,
if the case studies discussed in the paper by Eavey and Miller are correct.
24. Oddly, if an individual owned at least one slave, the number of slaves didn't seem to
affect his vote on ratification.
25. 0. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 212
(1989).

1990]

BOOK REVIEW

499

ate implications for any current issues of constitutional law. On the
other hand, they do have something new and interesting to say,
rather than rehashing tedious old debates. That alone makes this
volume much more profitable reading than the latest issues of most
leading law reviews.

